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PARETO OPTIMA AND  COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA WITH 
ADVERSE SELECTION AND  MORAL HAZARD' 
BY EDWARD  C.  PRESCOTT AND ROBERT M.  TOWNSEND 
This paper explores the extent to which standard, general equilibrium analysis of Pareto 
optima and of competitive equilibria can be applied to environments with moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems. Allowing for lotteries, contracts with random components, 
we first establish that an adverse-selection insurance economy,  a moral-hazard insurance 
economy,  a signaling economy,  and a private-information labor market economy  are all 
special cases of a simple, general structure. We then show that techniques for characteriz- 
ing Pareto optimal contracts as solutions to concave programming problems are useful and 
nice  and  appear  to  be  broadly  applicable;  allowing  for  lotteries,  we  show  how  to 
characterize the optimal allocations for the adverse-selection insurance and labor market 
economies. We then show that standard existence and optimality theorems for competitive 
equilibria apply in the linear space containing lotteries if agents with characteristics which 
are distinct and privately observed at the time of initial trading enter the economy-wide 
resource constraints in a homogeneous way (other kinds of diversity are not critical). For 
economies  with moral hazard which satisfy the homogeneity condition,  competitive con- 
tract markets single out a subset of the optima and thus can be consistent with apparent 
unemployment and with a random allocation of labor supplied though all households are 
averse to risk. The adverse-selection insurance and signaling economies, however, do not 
satisfy the homogeneity condition and are difficult to decentralize efficiently with a price 
system. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
THE  PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER is to explore the extent to which standard, general 
equilibrium analysis  of  Pareto  optima  and  of  competitive  equilibria can  be 
applied to economies with moral hazard and adverse selection problems. In these 
economies the information structure is explicit but private. Of particular interest 
are the Rothschild-Stiglitz  [21], Wilson [23] insurance economy,  in which each 
agent observes a parameter indicating the probability of suffering a loss, that is, 
whether he is a high risk or low risk agent; a Spence [22] signaling economy, in 
which each agent observes a parameter indicating his inherent productivity as 
well as  the direct or indirect disutility of  some unproductive activity; a moral 
hazard  insurance  economy  in  which  agents  can  take  an  unobserved  action 
determining the probability of suffering a loss; and a private-information labor 
market economy  in which households  suffer unobserved shocks to preferences 
(or to an underlying household production function). 
We proceed by showing in Section 2 that despite the apparent diversity among 
the above-mentioned economies, each can be viewed as a special case of a simple 
general structure with convex constraints and preferences. This is accomplished 
'Earlier  drafts  of  this  paper  have  been  presented  at  the  NBER  Conference  on  Theoretical 
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by considering consumption lotteries indexed by time and by privately-observed 
shocks  and  agent  types.  The  constraint  set  then  naturally  includes  certain 
incentive compatibility conditions, following the seminal work of Hurwicz [16]; 
these ensure that it is not in the interest of agents to misrepresent their private 
information. 
Section  3  establishes that  Pareto optimal  allocations  can  be  determined as 
solutions  to  the  problem  of  maximizing weighted  averages of  the  agent-type 
utilities  subject  to  the  incentive-compatibility  conditions  and  resource  con- 
straints, a concave programming problem. This result is then used to characterize 
the optima for both the adverse-selection insurance and the private-information 
labor market economy.  It is established as a by-product that the Rothschild- 
Stiglitz separating equilibrium is optimal in the space of lotteries under exactly 
the same conditions which make it optimal in the space of (apparently) determin- 
istic allocations. For the private-information labor market economy  it is estab- 
lished, generally, that optima are inefficient in the ex post full-information sense, 
being consistent with unemployment or overemployment of labor and even with 
a random allocation of labor though all households are averse to risk. The latter 
results complement  the findings of  Green and  Kahn  [12] and  Grossman and 
Hart [13] on ex post inefficiencies in labor contracts and especially Chari [7] in 
the use of lotteries. 
Section  4  begins  an  attack on  the  question  of  the applicability of  classical 
competitive  analysis  to  economies  which  can  be  mapped  into  our  general 
structure. Previously,  Prescott  and  Townsend  [19]  established  that  standard 
competitive analysis could be applied to a Fisherian dynamic securities economy 
with private information. For that economy competitive equilibria were shown to 
exist and to be optimal, in contrast to the problems that have been encountered 
for other private information economies  that also fall within our general struc- 
ture. With  the  approach employed  by  Spence  [22] in  his  studies of  signaling 
economies,  for example, there is a multiplicity of equilibria and they generally 
are not optimal. And with the approach employed by Rothschild-Stiglitz  [21], an 
equilibrium may fail to exist, and again, if one does exist, it may be nonoptimal. 
We  find  that the key  property upon  which standard existence and  optimality 
theorems depend has to do with only one aspect of the information structure of 
the economy, whether or not agents with characteristics which are distinct and 
privately observed at the time of initial trading enter the resource constraints in a 
homogeneous way: preferences, technology, other kinds of ex ante diversity, and 
ex post diversity are not critical. An implication of this result for economies with 
signaling opportunities is that nonoptimality, multiplicity, or nonexistence prob- 
lems do not arise if there is a market for contracts prior to agents knowing their 
(still privately observed) types. Neither are there problems for the moral hazard 
insurance economy, nor for the private-information labor market economy. 
In Section 4 we illustrate how the private-information labor market economy 
optimum can be supported in a competitive equilibrium. Each household chooses 
a contract which maximizes its expected utility subject to its budget constraint. 
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household and involves commitments to supply labor in return for the consump- 
tion  good.  Firms  in  our  labor  market  economy  are  viewed  as  producer- 
intermediaries which make commitments to hire labor and produce the consump- 
tion good. Again, the commitments are priced in a competitive market and firms 
.maximize profits. The  implication of  this section  is  that unemployment, over- 
employment, and random assignments, being consistent with optimal contracts, 
are also consistent with competitive equilibrium allocations. We have, in effect, 
taken  a  step  toward  a  synthesis  of  the  implicit  labor  contract  paradigm  of 
Azariadas [4], Bailey [5], and Gordon [11] with standard competitive analysis. 
The final section of the paper briefly reports on our efforts to secure standard 
existence and optimality theorems for all economies consistent with the general 
structure and  offers  an  instructive  contrast  to  our  results  for  the  private- 
information labor market economy  (among others). Apparently, there can be a 
fundamental (unavoidable) adverse selection problem if agents with characteris- 
tics which are distinct and privately observed at the time of initial trading enter 
the economy-wide resource constraints in a heterogenous way, as is the case for 
the adverse selection insurance and the signaling economies. 
2.  THE ECONOMIES 
Basic Mathematical Structure 
There are a finite number of agent types i =  1, . ..  , I and a continuum of each 
type. The fraction of agents of type i is denoted by Ai. The commodity space is a 
linear space L and the common consumption possibility set for each agent type, 
X c  L,  is  closed  and  convex.  The  utility  function  of  each  agent  of  type  i, 
Ui: X -  R, is concave (and frequently linear). The endowment of each agent is 
(  E L, the same for all agent types. Each agent's type is private information. The 
commodity space, consumption set, utility functions, and endowment will all be 
given more precise interpretations in the example-economies which follow. 
Let xi E L be a consumption allocation to each agent of type i. Let rik be a 
real-valued linear function on L (k =  1,  2, . ..  ,  K; i =  1,  2, . ..  ,  I).  Then society 
is subject to resource constraints of the form 
2X  irik  (xi-  ) ?0  (k = 1, ...,  K). 
Note that we allow there to be more than one constraint; the private-information 
securities economy of Prescott and Townsend [19] provides an example. 
An I-tuple x = (xi) of elements belonging to L is implementable  if 
(2.1)  xiEX,  alli, 
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The first requirement is that the consumption vector belong  to the individuals' 
consumption possibility set. The second is that each individual of type i weakly 
prefer xi to all the other xj. Thus it is not in the interest of any agent to claim to 
be of some other type. These are the ex ante incentive-compatibility constraints. 
Certain ex  post  incentive-compatibility  constraints arise naturally in  consider- 
ation of the set of all allowable contracts (see below) and thus help to determine 
the common consumption possibility set X. Justification for restricting attention 
to the class of allocations satisfying the incentive-compatibility constraints can be 
found  in  Harris and  Townsend  [14,  15]  and  Myerson  [18], building  on  the 
seminal work of  Hurwicz [16]. The third condition  is again the set of  resource 
constraints. 
In much of this paper L is assumed to have finite dimension. The assumption 
that  L  has  finite  dimension  simplifies  the  presentation  without  the  loss  of 
anything essential. Then, if both the ui(-)  and  rik(  )  are linear, we use the dot 
product to represent them; that is 
Ul xi.  Xu1  (xi) =  uilxd 
and similarly 
rik  Xi  rik(Xi)  =  riklXil 
where / indexes components of xi E  L. (Limiting arguments such as those used in 
Prescott and Townsend  [19] might well be  used to  establish the results of  this 
paper if L is not finite dimensional.) 
We now demonstrate how the well-known adverse-selection insurance, moral- 
hazard insurance, and signaling economies as well as a private-information labor 
market economy can all be represented in this framework. 
Adverse Selection Insurance Economy: E, 
Consider the following insurance environment that was considered by Roths- 
child-Stiglitz [21] and Wilson [23]. There is a continuum of agents; say the set of 
agents is the unit interval. Each agent of type i receives a random endowment z: 
t  zo  with probability  90, 
Z  z  with probability (1 -0  ).  zII 
Here 0 <  zo <  z1,  so when z = zo an agent is said to suffer a loss. This is public 
information. There are two types of agents by risk class, i =  1,2, where 0 <  9l 
<  02  <  1. Thus the 01-type agents are the low risk people and 82-type agents are 
the high risk people. Each agent's type is private information. Of people of type i, 
Oi  is also the fraction that will suffer a loss. Thus there is no aggregate uncertainty 
with the fractions of the various types, X., being known.2 
2As noted in Prescott and Townsend [19], both here and below, we proceed from an aggregate 
distribution to individual uncertainty rather than the other way in order to avoid certain well-known 
mathematics problems associated with measurability. See Bewley and Radner [6]. PARETO OPTIMA  25 
Each  agent  has  preferences on  C c  R +  as  defined  by  the  utility  function 
U: R + -*  R  where  U  is  strictly concave,  strictly increasing, and  continuously 
differentiable with  U'(0) =  oo. The  points  zo and  z,  belong  to  C.  Suppose  a 
consumer is assigned co if a loss is suffered and cl  if one is not. The expected 
utility for an agent of type i is then 
9i U(CO) +  (1  -i  ) U(c1) 
where c0, cl E  C. 
This environment can  be  cast in  terms of  the basic mathematical structure. 
One approach is to let L be R 2. Then let xi be a consumption allocation to agents 
of  type i  with the first component  being ci0 and  the second  cil.  The common 
endowment  is  ( = (z0, z ).  Then  X  corresponds  to  C x  C  and  is  closed  and 
convex provided C is closed and convex. The single linear resource constraint is 
EXi[  i(cio -  zo) +  (  -  91)(cil  -  1)]  0 .- 
The incentive compatibility constraints are 
i  U(cio) + (1 -  9)U(ci1) 2  9iU(c1o)  +  (1 -  0  all i,]. 
But the space of consumption allocations (xi) restricted by such constraints is not 
convex given the strict concavity of  U. 
An alternative approach which results in the utility function being linear, and 
therefore avoids  the nonconvexities  associated with the incentive compatibility 
constraints, is  to  consider lotteries on  C.  In order that the  space  L  be  finite 
dimensional,  the  set  C  is  assumed  finite  with  n  elements.  The  lotteries  are 
n-dimensional  vectors  specifying  the  probability  of  each  point  in  C,  say  yt 
=  ( t(c))cEc  where  c,u(c)  =  l and  t  (c) > 0 all c E  C. Let [t  be the lottery if a 
loss is suffered and y1 if one is not. The expected utility of ([t,  [L1)  for a type i 
individual is then 
WiJ([to  , it  1)  =  -i  U(c)  AO(c) +  (1  -  9i)  U(c)  itI(c). 
C  C 
It is also assumed here that fraction [t0(c) of agents of type i who suffer a loss 
receive the  allocation  c  and  similarly for yt1(c), so  that lotteries introduce no 
aggregate randomness. The endowment (  is a pair of probability distributions on 
C,  the  first one  of  which  assigns  probability one  to  z0 E  C  and  the  second 
probability one to z1 E  C. 
This  latter economy  can  be  put  into  the general mathematical structure as 
follows. Let L =  R 2n.  Let the first n elements of a consumption vector x, denoted 
x0, be the xoc = AO(c)  defined above for c E C, and let the second n elements of 
x, denoted xl,  be the xIC  = At1(c)  for c E  C. The consumption possibility set then 
requires that x0 and xl  be probability distributions; that is, 
X =  {tx  E  L:  ,xoc  =  1,  xic  = 1, x ?O} 
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Let the first n elements of the utility function ui be the 9i  U(c)  for c E  C and 
the second n elements (1 -  9) U(c)  for c E C. With these definitions 
Ui(X)  =  Ui * X  =  Wi(/0,  5') 
which is just the expected utility to an i-type of lottery t,o if a loss is suffered and 
lottery /i  if one is not. 
The common endowment t  is an element of L. The resource constraint is that 
average consumption be less than or equal to the average endowment: 
xRi  oizxiocc  +  (1 -  9i),xXi1cc  <  xi  oiL  Occ +  (1 -  Oi)E  lcc 
As there is a single resource constraint, the k subscript can be dropped on the 
resource constraint function rik.  The first n components of ri are the Sic for c E C 
and the next n components are (1 -  9)c.  Thus the resource constraint can be put 
in the form 
E  irs  - (Xi  -)  0 
as required by the general formulation. 
Signaling Economy: E2 
A  particularly interesting  class  of  economic  environments  are  those  with 
signaling opportunities. We  consider  the  following  simple  signaling economy. 
The set C is a subset of R  3  . The first component cl is consumption of goods, the 
second  c2 is the signal, and  the third c3  is consumption  of  leisure. The utility 
function for individuals of type i is linear in c, and of the form 
Ui(c)  =  9icl  -  C2, 
where the 9i have been ordered so that 9, <  02  <  .  . .  <  O,. The fraction of type i 
is Xi  > 0. Again, agent types are private information. 
The output of an individual is not observed. A finite fraction, albeit small, of 
the continuum of individuals is required to produce any output and the resulting 
productivity  of  a  group  is  the  average  of  the  productivities  of  the  group's 
members. These assumptions imply it is impossible to deduce anything about an 
individual's productivity by observing the output of his group. Let 7Ti  denote the 
output  of  the  consumption  good  per  unit  of  labor  of  individuals  of  type  i. 
Individuals with larger 9i are more productive so vz  >  v, - I >  ...  >  77  0. The 
assumption that the signal does not affect output is not crucial and was made for 
the sake of simplicity. The endowment of leisure time is unity. PARETO OPTIMA  27 
Because  agents are risk neutral, we  need  not  consider lotteries; that is,  the 
utility functions are already linear. If they were not risk neutral, following the 
previous example, it would be necessary to consider lotteries on C. 
To represent this economy within our basic structure, the commodity space L 
is  R 3  with  component  xl  as  consumption,  x2  as  signal,  and  X3 as  leisure 
consumed. The consumption possibility set is 
X=  {xCEL:X>0Ox3<  1} 
and the utility function for an i-type is 
Ui(X)  =  9iX1  -  X2. 
The endowment (  E  L is the vector (0, 0, 1). 
The resource constraint is 
2X  [Xi I  +  iT(Xi3  -  3)]  <0. 
This  states  that  the  average consumption  Ei  ixil  must  be  less  than  average 
production  ZA'WA3 
-  xi3).  As  for  the  previous  example,  there  is  a  single 
resource  constraint,  characterized by  the  vectors  ri E  R3  where  ri = (1,0, wi). 
With this definition the resource constraint can be put in the form 
E Xiri  (Xi  -)  < 
i 
as required by the general formulation. 
A Moral-Hazard Insurance  Economy: E3 
The adverse-selection insurance economy  E1 is modified as follows. There is 
only  one  type  of  agent,  so  we  can  ignore  the  Xi in  what  follows,  but  the 
probability of  loss  depends  upon  a  costly,  private action  of  the  agent.  More 
precisely, each agent receives a random endowment z E Z =  {  zo, z1 } with 0 <  zo 
< zI and the probability of z given the agent's action a E A =  {a1,a2,  ...  ,  am} 
is  z Ia.  The realization of z is public, the action taken is not. Also, the larger is 
action a, the smaller is the probability of loss 
Oz.  I  a.  The interpretation here is that 
a larger action corresponds to an agent being more careful. This is a standard 
set-up. 
Each agent has preferences on the finite set C x  A, where C is a finite subset 
of R + and has n elements. Preferences are defined by a utility function  U(c, a) 
where U is increasing in c, decreasing in a, and concave. For (c, a) E C X A, let 
Uca =  U(c,  a). 
In  terms of  our basic  mathematical structure, let the linear space  L  be  the 
Euclidean space of dimension n2m. A consumption vector x  is a triply indexed 
element (xcza)  for c E C, z E Z,  and a E A. The interpretation is as follows. A 28  E. C. PRESCOTT AND  R. M. TOWNSEND 
lottery with probabilities xa first determines an action a for each agent. Number 
xa is  also  the  fraction of  agents in  the population  who  are to  take action  a. 
Conditional on this action a, a second lottery with probabilities xcz  I  a determines 
consumption c and endowment z of the agent. Of course, nature plays a role in 
this  second  lottery since  the  conditional  probabilities ozla  are technologically 
determined constraints. In fact it is required that 
C 
for consistency. Finally, the marginal and conditional distributions xa and xczI  a 
determine the joint distribution  Xcza specified above. 
Agents have preferences on X where 
X=f(x  E  L+:  E  Xcza  =  1; 9zla3xcza  =  xczaalla,z; 
c, z, a  c, z  c 
2  UcaXcza  ?  E  Uca'Xcza 9  all  a, a' 
C,  z  C,  z  z I a 
The first constraint is that the probabilities sum to one. The second is that the 
probability distribution of z given a (if defined for that probability distribution) 
equals the technologically determined probability 9z  I  a. The third constraint is to 
ensure incentive compatibility. This is not obvious and is derived as follows. The 
commodity  point  x  must be  structured such  that if  a  occurs, it  is  not  in  the 
interest of the agent to choose some other action a'; that is, 
XaE  Uca xczIa?  XaE  Uca'Prtc,zIa'}. 
C, z  C, z 
Here Pr{  c, z  a'} is the probability of the pair (c, z) given that the agent is subject 
to lottery Xcza  but chooses action a'. Thus, under Xcza 
Prr c,z Ia )  =  Xc I  zaoz  I  a'=  Oz  I  a' 
By substitution, the above expression holds if and only if 
Z  Uca Xcz I  a Xa ? 2  Uca xcz I aXa 
a' 
C, z  C, z  z  a 
As  xcza =  x ,Iaxa,  the  third constraint indeed  ensures incentive  compatibility. 
This particular representation makes clear that set X is convex. 
Of course, there is also a resource constraint, that average consumption be no 
greater than average endowment, or 
E  Xcza(C  Z)  O< 
c, z,  a PARETO OPTIMA  29 
This  constraint  corresponds  to  constraint  (2.3)  in  the  basic  structure, with 
endowment t  being the zero vector in L. Here the single resource constraint takes 
on a special form, 
r *  (x  -  )  < O 
with rcza  =  c -  z. The vector r is not indexed by i. 
Private-Information  Labor Market Economy: E4 
Imagine an economy in which households have preferences over some market 
produced consumption good c and over labor supply / as represented by a utility 
function U0,(c,  1) which is continuous, concave, increasing in c, and decreasing in 
1. Here c and / are nonnegative real numbers, with a maximal labor supply of 1. 
Here  also  9 E e =  {  1,2)  is  interpreted as  one  of  two  possible  shocks  to  the 
household's  preferences at  the  time  of  consumption  and  labor  supply.3  Each 
household's shock is private information to  the household  in the consumption 
period. It is known that fraction As of households in the population will suffer 
shock  9  in  the  consumption  period.  Thus,  from  the  standpoint  of  a  prior 
planning period, each household regards \, as the probability of suffering shock 
9 in the consumption period. 
There are a finite number of firms in the economy, each with a technology for 
transforming labor /  into  output q of  the consumption  good  in a  linear way, 
namely q = al, a > 0; think of a fixed number of industrial projects, or a fixed 
number of plots of land in an agrarian economy. Firms are owned by households 
with predetermined profit shares in the population. With the constant returns to 
scale assumption, however, profits are necessarily zero in a competitive equilib- 
rium and thus will be disregarded in what follows. By the same token, we may 
act as if there were only one firm. 
The natural commodity bundle for households in this model is a consumption, 
labor-supply pair (c, 1). The space of such bundles would be used if trade were 
restricted to take place subsequent to the realization of household shocks 9. But 
trade can take place in the prior planning period. So, following Arrow [2] and 
Debreu  [10], it is natural to  index  the (c, 1) bundle  by  the household-specific 
shocks. Shocks are private to the household, however, so to circumvent incentive 
problems, we  suppose each  individual household  is  assigned a  contract which 
specifies consumption, labor supply pairs (c, 1) under a variety of individually- 
3The introduction of  shocks  to preferences may  seem somewhat artificial. But the economy  is 
readily given  a  deeper, more satisfactory interpretation. Suppose  in  particular that labor  can  be 
supplied also to a household production function, that is, there is a technology for transforming labor 
input into  output  of  an  idiosyncratic, home-produced good,  a  good  which  cannot  be  transferred 
among  households.  Suppose  also  that  the  household  production  function  is  subject  to  privately- 
observed technology shocks, 0. Finally, suppose households have preferences over consumption of the 
market-produced good,  the home-produced good,  and  total  labor supply. Then  this specification 
delivers an indirect utility function (as in the text) over consumption of the market-produced good 
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effected contingencies or options. For example, the contract might allow "sick" 
leaves, voluntary overtime, and so on, in addition to the "work-as-usual" option. 
(There is  no  monitoring  of  underlying circumstances.) The  point  is  that  the 
household  itself  chooses  which  option  to  effect  subsequent  to  its  underlying 
circumstance, its shock 9. Now  under any contract an individual household will 
act in its own best interest, inducing a natural ordering on outcomes, (c, 1) pairs, 
relative to its 9-contingent utility function. Thus, we may adopt a more abstract, 
canonical representation for any contract, following Harris and Townsend [14, 
15], and Myerson [18], and suppose, without loss of generality, that households 
make direct announcements of  their shocks 9 and that contracts are such that 
these  announcements  are  made  truthfully.  Finally,  we  suppose  the  further 
possibility  that a  contract  specifies  a  random (c, 1) bundle,  conditional  on  an 
announcement 9. For example, laborers may report to work under some circum- 
stances, but there need be no guarantee of employment. 
More formally then the labor market economy with planning period contracts 
is cast in terms of  the basic mathematical structure as follows. First, to ensure 
that  the  commodity  space  is  finite-dimensional,  restrict attention  to  a  finite 
number n of consumption-labor supply pairs (c, 1). Then let the commodity space 
L be R2n. The first n components of a consumption vector x E L, with typical 
elements, x1(c,l),  assign probability to  consumption-labor supply pairs condi- 
tional upon the announcement 9 =  1, with a similar interpretation for the second 
n components and  9 = 2. Households  are alike ex  ante in the planning period 
(but  not  ex  post),  so  the  X, and  i  may  be  dropped  from  the  notation.  The 
expected utility of the representative household is then 
U  (X) =2,  AS  E  xo (C,  I) UO  (C, I)* 
0  (C, l) 
Thus, the consumption possibilities set is 
X ={tx  e  L : x > O, 2,  x0(c,l)  = I for 9 =  1,2 and 
(c,l) 
x,  x(c,  1) U,(c,1)2  >  x,>(c,  1) U,9(c,  ) for 0, 0 E-= 
(c,l)  (c,l) 
This ensures both that the x9 are probability measures for each 9 and that in the 
consumption period each household will truthfully reveal its shock 9. 
The endowment t  E L is the element for which $0(c, 1) = 0 unless (c, 1) = (0, 0), 
i.e., 4  puts all probability on the zero point in the underlying commodity space. 
The resource constraint is that average consumption not exceed average produc- 
tion, that is 
E Xo 2,  x0  (c,  l  )c < 2  ,A E  x0  (c, l )al. 
0  (C, l)  0  (C, I) 
Here x0(c, 1) is interpreted as the fraction of agents of type 9 who are assigned 
the consumption-labor supply pair (c, 1). Thus  the resource constraint has  the PARETO OPTIMA  31 
form 
r *  (x  -()  <0O 
where component r,9  (c, l) = X9  (c  -  al). 
3.  PARETO OPTIMA 
Pareto  optimal  allocations  for  the  general  structure can  be  obtained  by 
maximizing weighted averages of the agent types' utilities. Let the set of possible 
weights be 
r=  {y  E= R':  Yi  >  O and  -Yi  =  1}I 
For y E r, let 0(y)  denote the set of consumption allocations which are solutions 
to the program 
Max  -  yiui  * xi 
x=(xi) 
subject to xi E X  all i, ui *  xi >  ui *  Xj all i and j,  and EiAirik *  (xi -)  < O all k. 
Thus 4(y)  is a subset of the I-cross product space of L. Finally, let 
(=  U  +(Y) 
yEF 
LEMMA 3.1:  The set  D contains all the Pareto optima. If y > 0 (i.e.,  yi > 0 all i), 
then all  allocations belonging to 0(y)  are optima. Finally, if an  I-tuple x = (xi) 
belongs to 4(y)  and if x  is not Pareto dominated by another element belonging to 
?(y), then  x is an optimum. 
PROOF: The constraints are convex and the objective function linear. Conse- 
quently, the utility possibility set is convex. Let y define a supporting hyperplane 
at  the point  on  the utility possibilities frontier associated  with Pareto optimal 
allocation  x*.  Such  a  hyperplane  exists  by  the  separation theorem.  For  this 
y* E I,  x*  is a solution to the program. This proves the first statement of  the 
lemma. 
To  prove  the  second  statement  consider  some  y > 0  and  some  allocation 
x E 4(y).  Suppose x  can be Pareto dominated. Then x  cannot be a solution to 
the -y-program.  This contradiction establishes that solutions to such programs are 
Pareto optima. 
To  prove  the  last  statement  of  the  lemma,  let  x  be  a  solution  to  some 
y-program with the specified nondominance  property, but suppose x  is not an 
optimum.  Then  there  exists  an  allocation  x'  which  Pareto  dominates  x.  By 
assumption, x' does not belong to 4(y).  But the value of x' for the -y-program  is 
at  least  as  great as  the  value  for  x,  and  thus x'  must  be  a  solution  to  the 
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THEOREM 3.1:  If the set X is compact and contains {, the set of Pareto optimal 
allocations is nonempty. 
PROOF:  A feasible solution exists namely xi =  for all i so the constraint set is 
nonempty.  The  objective  function  is  linear and  therefore continuous.  As  the 
resource and  incentive  constraints are closed,  a  continuous  function  is  being 
maximized  on  a  compact  set.  Consequently  for  any  y E  r,  a  solution  to  the 
program exists.  By  the  lemma,  a  solution  to  a  y-program  is  necessarily  an 
optimum if y > 0. 
Our  examples  with  lotteries  all  assume  that  the  underlying  consumption 
possibilities set C has a finite number of points. This is sufficient to ensure that 
set X  is  compact,  a  result that is  used  in  the  existence  argument. There is a 
straightforward extension  of  the  result  to  the  case  of  C  being  a  compact 
separable metric space, for example, a closed and bounded subset of R n with the 
Euclidean metric; with the weak topology, the set of probability measures on the 
Borel subsets of C is compact (under these weaker conditions) and the functions 
defining the objective and constraints are continuous. When the constraint set is 
defined  by  the  finite  set  of  linear  inequalities  (other  than  the  nonnegativity 
constraints), a stronger version of Lemma 3.1 holds; then every Pareto optimal 
allocation is the solution to a program with all components of  y positive.4 
Pareto Optima  for the Adverse-Selection  Insurance  Economy 
Rothschild  and Stiglitz  [21] demonstrate,  under certain  conditions,  that their 
separating equilibrium both exists and is an optimum within a more limited class 
of  allocations than the one we consider. One question that will be answered is 
whether that allocation is an optimum within our larger class of allocations. The 
principal result, however, is the complete specification of the set of Pareto optima 
for this insurance economy. 
Let z be the ex post per capita endowment, so 
z  i=  iizo  +  (1  -  Oi)Zl]. 
Per capita consumption is constrained by this quantity. With this definition, the 
program for determining the Pareto optima for -y  E  r  is the linear program 
Max 2yi  U(c)[Xi0oci + xilc(  -  i)] 
i  C 
xI ,x2  0, 
where xi0, is the probability of a type i consuming c E C conditional on a loss 
and xi,,  is the probability of a type i consuming c conditional on no loss, i =  1,  2. 
4We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this result. PARETO OPTIMA  33 
The constraints are 
(3.1)  E U(c)[(x  -  x20c)02  +  (  Xlc-X21c)(1  -  92)]  <  0 
c 
(agents of type two weakly prefer x2 to xI); 
(3.2)  2  U(c)[(x20c  -  x10c)91  +  (X21c -  x 10)(l  -  91)]  <  0 
c 
(agents of type one weakly prefer x,  to x2); 
(3.3)  x ic[Xiocoi  + xilc(l  -  9,)]  < 1 
i,c 
(this is the single resource constraint); 
(3.4)  E x1o=  1, 
c 
(3.5)  E  XI  IC  l, 
c 
(3.6)  E  X20c=-"  19 
c 
(3.7)  EX21c=  I  (probabilities  sum to one). 
Letting uk denote the Lagrange  multiplier  associated  with constraint  (3.k), 
differentiating with respect to the x1oc  yields the first-order conditions, 
(3.8)  Y1  U(C)OI-tl-  U(C)02  +  12U(0)1,-  3C91X,  +  N  <_ 0 
for all c E C. Analogous  first-order  conditions  hold for the  X20c  I the xl IC  and the 
X21c  . 
Constraint (3.8) must hold with equality for some c E C. Otherwise all the xIoc 
would be zero and that would violate constraint (3.4). The left-hand side of (3.8) 
can be viewed as a function of c. Thus, the Lagrange multipliers must be such 
that this function has a maximum (of zero) at points at which condition  (3.8) 
holds as an equality. Now  suppose the set C has an arbitrarily large number of 
elements,  so  that  the  maximal  distance  between  any  point  and  its  nearest 
neighbor is arbitrarily small. Also recall that u(  ) is strictly concave. Then if 
(3-9a)  7101 -A102  +  A201 <  ? 
the left-hand side of  (3.8) is a strictly decreasing convex  function of  c  and so 
attains a maximum at c = 0. If 
(3.9b)  7101  -A102  +  A201 >  ? 
the  left-hand  side  of  (3.8)  is  strictly concave  function  of  c  and  so  attains  a 
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arbitrarily large). In summary the result is that xlOc equals one for some c E C 
and zero otherwise. By precisely the same argument, probability measures x, 
x20, and x21 place all their mass on single points denoted by cll,  c20, and c21, 
respectively. These points depend upon the weights y chosen. 
One implementable allocation  is for everyone to consume  z  independent of 
their realized endowment. The utility for this allocation is U(z)  for everyone. If 
one  agent  type  realizes expected  utility  exceeding  U(z),  that  type's  expected 
consumption, by Jensen's inequality, must exceed z. This implies via the resource 
constraint that the expected consumption of the other type agents is less than z 
and, by Jensen's inequality, their expected utility less than U(z). 
We  divide  the  Pareto  optima  into  three sets.  The  first is  for  everyone  to 
consume z  with certainty. The second set contains those optima for which the 
expected utility of type one agents exceeds U(z) and the third are those for which 
the expected utility of type one agents is less than U(z). 
It can be established that for set two there is no uncertainty in consumption 
for type two agents (i.e., c20=  C21 =  c2). Suppose the contrary. By  eliminating 
uncertainty  in  the  consumption  of  type  two  agents  (if  there  is  any)  while 
preserving their expected consumption, the utility of type two agents is increased, 
the resource constraint continues  to  be  satisfied, and  slack is introduced into 
constraint (3.1).  Note  that constraint (3.2)  continues  to  be  satisfied:  expected 
consumption of type two agents is less than I  in set two so the type one agents 
strictly prefer their allocation xl  which yields expected utility greater than U(z) 
to the no uncertainty x2 allocation. This also establishes that A2  =  0  in set two. 
And c10  I  CII  as well, for otherwise (3.1) would be violated. 
Actually constraint (3.1) is binding in set two for otherwise c 0 and cII could be 
made more nearly equal while preserving the expected consumption of type one. 
This  increases expected  utility of  type  one.  Resource  constraint  (3.3)  is  also 
binding for if it were not, by increasing c2 a little, expected utility of  type two 
agents could be increased without violating any constraint. Since (3.1) and (3.3) 
are binding, c10 and c,,  must satisfy 
(3.10)  92 U(C10) +  ( 1 -  2) U(cI  1) =  U(c2) 
and 
(3.11)  X1[9  I1c0  +  (1  -  91)c1  ] +  X2c2  =  2 
for elements of Pareto optima set two. To find the solution to (3.10) and (3.11), 
consider the space of (c 0, cl  I) pairs. The point c2 lies in this space on the 450  line 
below  the  negatively  sloped  line  (3.11).  (Recall  c2 <  z.)  Thus  the  negatively 
sloped line (3.11) intersects the indifference curve for which (3.10) is satisfied at 
two points. The better of the solutions for agents of type one is the one for which 
cI0 <  c2 <  cII. Subsequently, cI0 and cII are functions of c2 as the better solution 
to (3.10) and (3.11). 
This nearly completes the specification of the allocations in Pareto optima set 
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positive. We  exploit  this condition  with the additional assumption that all  the 
optimal  allocations  are  interior  points  of  the  set  C  and  that  the  set  C  is 
sufficiently large to insure that such allocations satisfy the appropriate conditions 
for  maxima  as  if  C  were  a  continuum.  Thus,  given  that  02  =  0  and  that 
C20=  C2=  c2, from  (3.8) and  the  analogous  first-order  conditions 
-71 -112/91  ] U'(CIo) =  3/\I 
-71  -(1  -  2)/(1  -  9k)] U'(C1)  =  3XI 
(31) 
72 +  AI ]U  (C2) =  A3X2 =  A30-  X), 
71 +  72=  " 
Given  c2, these are four linear equations in the unknowns  ,,  y3,  y  I  and  72. 
(Remember c1o  and cII are functions of c2 being the better solution to (3.10) and 
(3.11).) An additional requirement is that the solution to (3.12) (which exists) be 
nonnegative. It is tedious to establish, but this requirement is that 
X2  02 -  l  U'(C2)[  U'(CI0) -U'(CII)  (3.13)  X1 91(1 -  91) 
- 
U'(CIO)  (Cll) 
As  c2 approaches z,  the distance between c1O  and c11 goes  to zero. Therefore, 
given  that  U  is  continuously  differentiable,  for  c2  sufficiently  near  z,  this 
inequality is satisfied. Thus, Pareto optima set two is nonempty. Finally, let e2 be 
the minimal level for which inequality (3.13) is satisfied. Then it holds for all 
c2 <  c2 <  z.  If  this were not  the case,  the  utility possibility  set  would  not  be 
convex. 
The argument for characterizing optima set three is symmetric with respect to 
the  agents'  types  with  some  obvious  exceptions  necessitated  by  the  fact  that 
92> >.  To characterize optima for set three interchange subscripts for the two 
agent types with the exception that one uses the solution to (3.10) and (3.1 1) for 
which c20  >  c2,  and the direction of inequality (3.13) is reversed. 
As  condition  (3.10), (3.11), and (3.13) along with the additional requirement 
that  the  contracts be  actuarially fair are just  those  for  the  optimality  of  the 
Rothschild-Stiglitz  separating equilibrium allocation,  that allocation  is  Pareto 
optimal in our larger class of allocations as well. 
Randomness  in consumption  is used to separate the agents. The agent type 
realizing  the  higher  expected  utility  incurs  the  uncertainty. The  cost  of  this 
uncertainty is less to agents of that type and they are more than compensated for 
it by higher expected consumption. 
Pareto Optima  for the Private-Information  Labor Market Economy 
This subsection makes the point that the introduction of private information 
alone  into  an otherwise standard environment can  produce not  only  apparent 
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labor supplied in a world where all households are averse to risk. The key to this 
conclusion is that ex post full-information inefficiencies and randomness are both 
consistent with ex ante private-information optimal allocations. 
The  program for  determining the  optima  for  the  private-information labor 
market economy is the linear program 
Max  EX9x9(C,l)U9(c,l) 
X9  (C, l)  @ 
subject to 
(3.21)  xI(c, 1) Ul(c, 1) 2  x2(c, 1) Ul(C,  1), 
(c,)  (c,l) 
(3.22)  E  XA(C,  1) UA(C,  1) 2  XI  x(C,  1) UA(C,  1), 
(c,)  (c,l) 
(3.23)  E  xo  x,9(c, 1) al>EXO  X'  x(C, I) c, 
9  (C,i)  9  (c,l) 
(3.24)  E  x(c,1)  =  1, 
(cil) 
(3.25)  E  x2(c,l)  =  1. 
(c, i) 
Here (3.21) and (3.22) are the relevant incentive compatibility constraints, those 
which  will  cause  household  of  type  9  to  truthfully announce  it  is  of  type 9. 
Constraint (3.23) is the resource constraint while (3.24) and (3.25) require that the 
probabilities sum to one. 
In  this  subsection,  attention  is  restricted to  economies  in  which  the  utility 
functions are separable having the form 
Us  (C, l) =  V(C)-  W9(l). 
The function V(.)  is strictly increasing and strictly concave with V'(O)  =  xo. The 
functions W9 are strictly increasing and convex. Agents of type two are assumed 
uniformly more risk averse with respect to labor supply; that is, W1"(l)  <  W2"(l) 
for all 0 <  1  <  1. It is also supposed for simplicity that X1  =  X2 =  1/2. 
An upper bound for the value of the program is obtained when the program 
without the incentive constraints is solved. This latter program is easily solved for 
an optimum exists in the space of deterministic allocations (degenerate lotteries). 
An interior solution for this less constrained program satisfies 
V'(cI)  =V(C2), 
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Here c9 and 19  are the deterministic consumption and labor supply for type 9. 
Thus at an interior solution to the less constrained program the marginal utility 
of consumption and the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for labor 
supply are equal across agent types, with the latter equal to the marginal product 
of  labor,  a.  Of  course,  the  resource constraint  will  be  satisfied  at  equality: 
cl  +  C2=  all  +  at2. 
An interior solution to the unconstrained program generally will not satisfy the 
incentive constraints. To see this, note that in such a solution consumptions are 
necessarily equal across agent types, say, equal to c. So, to satisfy the incentive 
constraints labor supplied must be equal as well, say, equal to 1. Then from the 
resource constraint, c = al.  But the points  at which  W4(l) = aV'(al)  generally 
will differ for the two 9 types. Thus, with incentive constraints imposed, the best 
deterministic allocation yields value strictly less than the optima when they are 
not imposed. We now introduce lotteries into labor supply and make the point 
that with  differences in  risk aversion such  lotteries can  lessen  the  impact  of 
incentive constraints. 
This  is  well  illustrated by  the  following  parametric specification.  Suppose 
V(c) =  ln(c),  W1(l) =  1, and  W2(l)  =  12/3.  Thus, households of type one ex post 
are risk neutral in labor supply. Without the incentive constraints, the solution to 
the program would be  c1 =  C2=  a,  1 =  1/2,  and  12=  3/2.  This allocation vio- 
lates the incentive constraints, for type two would claim to be of type one. But, 
randomness can be introduced into the labor supply of type one. This does not 
affect  the  utility of  type  ones  as  they  are risk neutral in  labor  supply. This 
randomness does  make  the allocation  to  type one  less attractive to  type  two. 
Consider the following allocations. With certainty set cl  =  C2=  a  and 12 =  3/2. 
Set  1 = 0 with  probability (1 -  a)  and  set  1 =  I  with  probability a  where a 
satisfies (1 -  a) - 0 +  al =  1/2.  This  allocation  satisfies all  the constraints and 
yields  the  same  value  as  the  program  absent  the  incentive  constraints  for 
sufficiently large 1. 
The example just described illustrates in a dramatic way the gain to lotteries; 
here  the  utility  of  a  full-information  optimum  can  be  achieved,  though,  in 
general, we think full-information optimality an inappropriate welfare criterion. 
But the example is unsatisfactory for this subsection in that labor supply is not ex 
post  inefficient;  despite  the  randomness,  the  marginal rate of  substitution of 
consumption for labor supply for all households equals the marginal product of 
labor. 
We now establish that there must be randomness in labor supply for econo- 
mies sufficiently close to this special economy with all types strictly risk averse in 
labor supply. We also establish that there can be no randomness in consumption 
for either type. With randomness in  a  type's labor supply, otherwise identical 
agents supply different quantities of labor. Thus, with constant consumption, the 
ex post  marginal rate of  substitution between  consumption  and  labor  supply 
cannot equal the corresponding marginal rate of transformation for all agents of 
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We first establish that for an optimum the lottery on consumption is degener- 
ate. Among the first-order conditions for the above-given program are 
(3.26)  (X1  +  ,?  -  A2)V(c) -  3XIc-  (X1  +  pl)WI(l)  +  A2W2(l)  +  A3X1al  +  A4 
<0 
for  all  (c, 1)  where  the  Lagrange  multipliers  are  numbered  in  accord  with 
equation  (3.2j)  of  the constraints. This condition  must hold  with  equality for 
some (c, 1) pair. To discover where equality is achieved, it is convenient to view 
the left-hand side of  (3.26) as a function  of  c  and 1. If (X1  + y1 -  A2)  <  0,  the 
left-hand side of (3.26) would be a convex, strictly decreasing function of c, and 
so would achieve a maximum with respect to c, holding 1 fixed, at c = 0. Thus, 
consumption would be deterministic at c = 0, but this cannot be a solution with 
V'(O)  = -o.  Thus (X1  +  /I  -  A2) >  0  and the left-hand side of  (3.26) achieves a 
unique  maximum with  respect to  c  at  some  cl > 0  independent  of  1 (on  the 
assumption that the distance between adjacent c's can be made arbitrarily  small). 
By a similar argument, consumption of  type two households is deterministic at 
some c2 > O. 
We now establish that for some economies there must be randomness in labor 
supply for some agent type. We assume  V(c) =  ln(c),  W2(l)  =  12/3,  and  WI(l) 
=  1A,  1 K<  ,.  The limit as ,8 approaches one is the parametric example considered 
previously.  For  the  limit  8 =  1,  we  have  shown  that  the  best  deterministic 
allocation  yields  an  expected  utility that is  strictly less  than  the value  of  the 
optimum in the space of lotteries. It can be established by a careful continuity 
argument that this must also be true for all ,B in some open right-neighborhood 
of one. This establishes the need for lotteries on labor supply for some economies 
with all types strictly risk averse. 
The randomness in labor supply requires that at the deterministic optimum, 
the agent  supplying less labor be  sufficiently  less risk averse in  labor supply. 
Then,  by  introducing  randomness  in  that  type's  labor  supply  and  reducing 
differences in consumption between types, the incentive problems can  be  less- 
ened and expected ex ante utility increased. 
4.  COMPETITIVE CONTRACT MARKETS IN ECONOMIES WITH 
MORAL-HAZARD 
In this section we define a standard competitive equilibrium in our commodity 
space. That is, we define  the price system on  the linear space L,  and  optimal 
actions  are defined  relative to  that price system. In  equilibrium, consumption 
choices are maximal in the budget set, a production choice maximizes profits in 
the production possibilities set, and markets clear. Thus the economy  is decen- 
tralized in  the  usual  way.  As  it  turns  out,  such  a  competitive  equilibrium 
construct  is  successful  in  the  moral  hazard  insurance  economy,  the  private- 
information labor market economy,  and virtually any other economy  in which 
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rik=  rk for all i. That is, in such environments competitive equilibria exist, are 
optimal, have a natural market interpretation, and yet are capable of explaining 
apparent  nonmarket  clearing  phenomena.  We  illustrate  this  success  in  the 
context of the private-information labor market economy. 
We should perhaps reiterate here that we are following the Arrow and Debreu 
treatment of time and uncertainty. Our competitive contract markets operate at 
some  initial  date,  and  the  contracts  or  commodities  which  are  traded  are 
commitments to take specified, possibly random, actions under various possible 
contingencies. As time evolves and observed and unobserved states of nature are 
realized, these commitments (contracts) are honored. Thus there are no ex post 
spot markets, though here these might be mutually beneficial ex post. We do not 
pretend to offer here a theory of the determination of market structure or legally 
enforceable agreements. 
We  begin by  following  Prescott and Townsend  [19], defining  a  production- 
intermediation set  Y in such a way that y  E  Y and a standard market clearing 
condition  iXiX(xi  - {)  = y  imply the resource constraint (2.3). Namely let 
(4.1)  Y = {y  E L:  rk(y) < 0 all k}. 
This production-intermediation set can be interpreted as an exchange technology 
where negative (positive) components  correspond to  a  commitment  to  take in 
(distribute) resources. These  commitments  can  be  indexed  by  agent  types;  in 
effect,  commitments  can  vary across agents with observable characteristics or 
with unobservable but declared characteristics. But the weights that agent types 
receive, the rk, are fixed by the exchange technology Y, beyond the control of the 
firm-intermediary. (We  shall  give  a  more  detailed  interpretation of  the  pro- 
duction-intermediation set for the private-information labor market economy in 
what follows.) In summary, then, we use the following definition. 
DEFINITION  4.1:  A  competitive equilibrium is  an  (I +  I)-tuple  ((x,*),  y*)  of 
elements of  L  and  a price vector p* E L  for which  (i) for each  i  element xi* 
maximizes ui(x) over the set {x  E X: p* - x <  p* *  t};  (ii) element y  * maximizes 
p*  y  over the set Y; and (iii) 2  iXx? =y*  +  (. 
Existence and optimality of competitive  equilibria  can be established quite gener- 
ally. In Prescott and Townsend [19] we established in some detail the existence of 
a  competitive equilibrium for a private-information securities economy.  More- 
over, the proof given there, which relies heavily on  the now standard existence 
arguments as  in  Arrow-Hahn  [3], Debreu  [9], McKenzie  [17], and  others, is 
applicable to other economies. We shall give, in what follows, a more direct proof 
of  the existence of  a competitive equilibrium for the private-information labor 
market economy, emphasizing the economic interpretation and taking advantage 
of  the representative agent construct. (We  might well have  chosen  the  moral- 
hazard insurance economy.)  But we reiterate that ex ante diversity of  the kind 
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equilibria. As for optimality, we note that in the space of lotteries, consistent with 
our general environment, preferences and the consumption set are convex. Thus 
by  Debreu  [8], competitive  equilibrium allocations  are Pareto optimal. Again, 
this will be established directly in what follows for the private-information labor 
market economy. Again, more general arguments are contained in Prescott and 
Townsend [19]. 
To begin the discussion-for the private-information labor market economy, let 
a generic point  in the (underlying) commodity  space be  an output, labor pair 
denoted (c, 1) and assume as before that there are a finite number of such pairs. 
Now  suppose that prior to the resolution of uncertainty, that is, in the planning 
period market, each of  the finite number of firms is allowed to make commit- 
ments to  the market (say, to brokers or marketeers) to  supply any number of 
units of  any such (c, 1) pair. More formally, let y9(c, 1), if positive, denote  the 
number of commitments to produce c units of output for and to hire 1 units of 
labor from households who announce  they are of  type 9 (such announcements 
are public information). Each of the firm-intermediaries, then, is constrained by 
a production-intermediation possibilities set Y defined by 
(4.2)  Y  =  {y9(c,l)}:  2 X9 2  y9(c,l)(al-  c)?  01 
9  (C,i) 
In effect  (4.2)  states that each  firm-intermediary cannot  plan  to  distribute on 
average more of the consumption good than it produces on average. (Note  that 
each firm-intermediary takes the coefficients or weights in Y as given, beyond its 
control.) The actions of the firm-intermediary are priced in competitive markets 
and these prices are taken as given. That is, let p9(c, 1) be the per unit price of the 
y,9(c,  1)  commitment  in  terms  of  some  abstract  unit  of  account.  Then  the 
firm-intermediary acts to maximize profits, 
(4.3)  E  E  y  (C,  ')P  (C,  1), 
9  (C,i) 
subject toy  E  Y. Recall that we are supposing firm-intermediaries  are owned by 
households, but again, with the constant returns to scale assumption, profits will 
be zero and profit shares are disregarded. And again we may act as if there were 
only one firm-intermediary. 
Households also make commitments to the market over output, labor pairs but 
with a different interpretation. Households are imagined to choose ex ante, in the 
planning period market, a contract with options, indexed by 9 E e. Each option 
is a (possibly degenerate) lottery over consumption, labor supply pairs, and the 
household can choose the terms of the lottery as well. But the options are such 
that a household of type 9 ex post will choose ex post the option indexed by 9 if 
indeed it suffers shock 9. Again, see the motivating remarks in Section 2. Finally, 
of course, all the contracts are priced in a competitive market. More formally, let 
the consumption  set X  and  endowment  {69(c,l)}  be  as  defined  in  Section  2. 
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expected utility 
,4)~~~~~C  1  )(c 
/)U  c 
8  (c,l) 
by choice of x  E  X subject to the budget constraint 
(4.5)  PO  p(C,  1)x,,(C,1)<  E  PO  (C,  1)6q(C,  ). 
9  (c,l1)  9  (C, 1) 
To  reiterate, each household purchases a contract as a package, and does  not 
really purchase the  individual  components  separately. But  the valuation  of  a 
contract is determined by the sum of the valuations of its individual components. 
To  be  noted  again  is  that  the  economy  here  is  decentralized by  the  price 
system in  the usual way.  Thus  to  ensure consistency  of  the actions  taken by 
households and the firm-intermediary, a market clearing condition is needed: 
(4.6)  y9  (C,l)  =  x9(c,l)  -  4 (c,l)  all  9 E 8,  all (c,l)  pairs. 
Note that condition (4.6) when substituted into the production-intermediation set 
(4.2) yields the resource constraint. 
It is now easily established that a competitive equilibrium exists and is optimal. 
First note from the profit maximization hypothesis and constant returns to scale 
condition that 
P* (c, 1)  = X (c-al)  all  G  E  e,  all (c, I)  pairs, 
is  the  only  possible  candidate  for  the  equilibrium price  system  up  to  some 
arbitrary normalization. (We have,  in effect,  let the consumption good  be  the 
numeraire.) This price system on bundles (c, 1) has a natural interpretation. From 
the standpoint of  the firm-intermediary, prices of  bundles increase with higher 
output c  at rate X. (that is, revenue increases) and prices decrease with higher 
labor input 1 at rate X9a  (that is, cost increases). Moreover, the tradeoff under this 
price system between labor and output is the parameter a, so in effect we have 
marginal  productivity  pricing.  We  note  of  course  that  bundles  for  use  by 
different  household  types  can  be  priced  differently.  From  the  standpoint  of 
households'  budget  constraints, increases in  consumption  c  raise expenditures 
while increases in labor supplied I raise income. The price of a (c, 1) bundle for 
use  under  the  0-option  is  A.(c -  al)  while  the  price  of  a  (c, 1) bundle  with 
probability a is aAe  (c -  al);  that is, the price system is linear in lotteries.5 
Substitution of the p*(c, 1) into the budget constraint for the household yields 
the linear program which determines Pareto optima. Thus, a solution exists and 
is  Pareto optimal, and  competitive  equilibrium condition  (i)  is satisfied. Then 
setting y*(c, 1) =  x7(c,  1) -  69(c, 1),  market clearing  condition  (iii)  is  satisfied. 
Finally,  substitution  of pq(c, 1) into  profits (4.3)  makes  clear  that profits  are 
nonpositive. But the budget constraint (4.5) is satisfied as an equality, so in fact 
profits are zero under yg*(c,  1). Thus condition (ii) is satisfied. 
5Evidently the price system is linear in underlying commodities c and / for fixed  9, but may vary 
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How will the competitive equilibrium allocation be effected? As is standard in 
general equilibrium competitive analysis, the market assignment process and the 
price-determination process  are  unspecified.  To  be  more  specific  though,  we 
might  suppose  that  there are a  finite  number of  marketeers or  labor-brokers 
which  make  up  the  planning  period market. Each  broker has  called  out  the 
competitive equilibrium price vector and has attracted a representative pool  of 
workers and  one  firm-intermediary (the  brokers are  really households  them- 
selves). Each household in the pool of the broker has entered into the contract 
{xg,(c, 1)). The firm has committed itself to input-output vector {yg*(c,  l)}.  Next, 
in the consumption period, each household truthfully announces its shock 9. If 
{  xf,(c, 1)) is not degenerate in labor supply, then the broker uses some random 
sorting device to select workers from its pool in the proper proportions. These are 
directed to the firm consistent with planning period demand. The consumption 
good is then produced and distributed by the broker to all workers in the pool in 
accordance with {  x(c,  1)}, as if under a wage-benefit or insurance package. We 
are assuming, of course, that planning period contracts are honored (or costlessly 
enforced by a legal system); that is, there can be no collusion in labor supply 
among households (say to eliminate risk) and no ex post spot markets. 
Now  suppose  an  outside  observer were  to  see  the  realized  outcome  of  a 
competitive equilibrium allocation. We have just established that such an alloca- 
tion is optimal, so we know its properties from Section 3. But these properties 
might lead the outside observer to conclude that the realized outcome is inconsis- 
tent with the competitive  market  paradigm: if labor and output are fully observed, 
then the constant marginal product of labor might be inferred. That then might 
naturally be taken as the wage rate. If households were asked to indicate whether 
they would like to work more at that wage rate, some would so indicate. Thus 
there would  be  measured unemployment  (nonmarket clearing). Moreover, the 
outside  observer might see  disparities in  employment  among  households  who 
indicate  they  are  otherwise  identical,  as  if  employment  were  capricious  or 
random. Conceivably, some households might be completely unemployed, while 
others  work  up  to  maximum  capacity.  But,  again,  such  outcomes  are  not 
inconsistent  with  the  competitive  market  paradigm  if  the  objects  which  are 
traded  are  carefully  defined.  As  we  have  indicated,  such  outcomes  can  be 
optimal from the ex ante point of view of the representative household, and can 
be achieved in competitive markets for labor contracts with appropriately speci- 
fied options. We have, in effect, taken a step toward a synthesis implicit labor 
contract theory with standard competitive analysis. 
5.  STANDARD  COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN ECONOMIES WITH ADVERSE 
SELECTION: THE DIFFICULTIES  OF PRICE DECENTRALIZATION 
Unlike  the  moral-hazard  insurance  and  private-information  labor  market 
economies, the resource constraints in the adverse-selection insurance and signal- 
ing economies are of the form 
(5.1  iri 
X 
(  Xi  f-  _k  =  1X ..  r  K PARETO OPTIMA  43 
rather than of the less general form 
(5.2)  XArk'  (Xi-(  < 0  (k =  11,  . . .,I K). 
This turns out to be a very important difference, for production and consump- 
tion activities cannot be separated as before.6 To see this, let 
(5.3)  Y=  yEL:ZXjirik  *y?!O  , k =  1, ... .  K 
be  the  candidate  for  the  production-intermediation possibilities set.  If  rik= rk 
for  all  i,  then  the  production-intermediation  set  (5.3)  is  the  production- 
intermediation set (4.1) used previously. In that case market clearing, i.e., 
(5.4)  y =  zxi(Xi  -) 
i 
andy  belonging to  Y imply the resource constraint. But, in general, (5.1), (5.3) 
and (5.4) are inconsistent. 
As it turns out, three natural ways to circumvent this adverse-selection prob- 
lem  all  fail  to  decentralize the  economy  in  the usual way.  In  this section  we 
summarize what we have learned in these attempts. For a more detailed discus- 
sion, the reader is referred to the working paper, Prescott and Townsend [20]. 
One  attack on  the inconsistency  (adverse-selection) problem is  to  ignore it, 
with the hope  that it fails  to  occur  in  equilibrium, in  a  standard competitive 
equilibrium, that is, in which decisions are completely decentralized by a price 
system. Thus, one might make use of the production-intermediation set (5.3) in 
the obvious commodity spaces. For the adverse-selection insurance economy, the 
obvious commodity space is the space of loss, no-loss consumption bundles. But 
that with (5.3) implies the same  budget line for all household types, the (average) 
market-odds line  of  Rothschild-Stiglitz,  and  that with  diversity across house- 
hold-types implies the nonexistence of a standard competitive equilibrium. For 
the  Spence  signaling economy,  the  obvious  commodity  space  is  the  space  of 
commodity  triplets specifying consumption,  signal, and labor supply. But that 
with (5.3) implies a zero price for the signal, with labor priced in terms of  the 
consumption  good  at  the  average productivity. Thus,  a  standard competitive 
exists  for  the  Spence  signaling  economy,  but  it  involves  no  signaling,  the 
phenomenon which the model was intended to explain. 
Motivated  by  these considerations one  might hope  to  allow  different agent 
types  to  choose  different  commodity  bundles  in  equilibrium. Hence,  we  ex- 
panded  the  commodity  space  in  an  obvious  way.  Namely,  for  the  Spence 
signaling economy  we  supposed different signals could  be  treated as different 
6There would  be  separation in  the  signaling economy  if  markets opened  prior to  individuals 
knowing their types. Thus, signaling opportunities per se are not the cause of failure. Similarly, this 
failure would have arisen in the environment of Prescott-Townsend  [19] if there were some statistical 
dependence in the 9-shocks and the initial specification of i types. And there would be a problem in 
the  moral-hazard insurance  economy  if  it  were  combined  with  the  adverse-selection  insurance 
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commodities, each with a potentially distinct price in terms of the consumption 
good.  We  also introduced a production-intermediation set, with coefficients  in 
the technology which firms treat parametrically, but which in fact are functions 
of the households' equilibrium consumption choices. We then defined a standard 
competitive equilibrium with production externalities and established that all the 
Spence signaling equilibria are examples of equilibria of that kind, including the 
no-signaling equilibria, the minimal-signaling equilibria, and  the over-signaling 
equilibria. Of course, many of these are Pareto nonoptimal; indeed, many can be 
Pareto ranked. We also established that an analogous procedure could be applied 
to the adverse-selection insurance economy  to support a bewildering variety of 
standard competitive equilibria (with production externalities). Thus equilibria of 
this kind fail to provide much predictive content and have undesirable normative 
properties as well. 
We also expanded the commodity space in a different way, following the spirit 
of  Arrow [1], with  the intent  of  removing externalities. More  specifically,  we 
indexed  the  original  commodity  point  in  the  general  structure by  i,  thereby 
increasing the dimensionality by factor I. Again, the new commodity point has 
the interpretation of a contract with options which are effected by the individual 
households.  In this expanded  space there is a specification of  the production- 
intermediation set (without externalities) which is always consistent with market 
clearing and the resource constraints. Thus one can consider an extension of the 
standard support theorem for Pareto optimal allocations. In fact, we established 
that there is a price system such that every Pareto optimum can be supported in 
a kind of competitive equilibrium. But the competitive equilibrium is restricted in 
that the  assignment in  the optimum  to  other agent  types must be  taken into 
account  in  each  household's maximization problem. In  effect,  then,  there are 
externalities in consumption. Moreover, the same support theorem can be used to 
establish that unrestricted competitive equilibria in the indexed commodity space 
generally do  not exist for the signaling and adverse-selection insurance econo- 
mies. 
We conclude that there do seem to be fundamental problems for the operation 
of  competitive markets for economies  or situations which  suffer from adverse 
selection. We have not discovered a standard competitive equilibrium construct 
which would predict well in such situations. 
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